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In the two centuries of its' independence, the U.S. has 
demonstrated very ambivalent attitudes toward the lands to her 
south with which it shares the westem hemsiphere. 
Nevertheless, physical geography has forged an 
inescapable bond, and variegated economic, cultural and ethnic 
difference have imposed a wide spectrum of ever-changing effects 
on both the U.S. and her Latín American and Caribbean 
neighbors. 
U.S. policy towards the área has vacillated between 
concern for the security of the U.S. and concern for the well-
being, particularly the political well-being the political freedoms 
of the peoples of the área. Thomas Hughes was, I believe, the 
first to use the terms "security culture" and "equity culture" in 
reference to these two elements which describe the two principal 
axes of U.S. foreign policy in the western hemisphere. 
Both elements appeared eariy in the 19th century as the 
Congress debated the issue of recognition for the new nations 
which carne into being to the south as the seeds of the American 
and French revolutions took root in the southem part of the 
hemisphere. Then, as through most of these two centuries, the 
security culture was predominant. From the begiiming of its 
history, the Urúted States expressed concern for possible Spaiüsh 
and/or Holy Alliance attempts to retake the rebellious colonies, 
and, particularly in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, expressed 
fear lest the Tsar of All The Russias might extend and consolídate 
his domain south from Alaska along the Pacific Coast 
After the purchases of Louisiana and Florida and the 
seizure of a substantial part of México, which assvired a tenitorial 
basis for the expression of "Manifest Destiny", U.S. policy towards 
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Latín America can best be described as "trans-isthntían." The 
obvious need for a means to link the Atiantic and Pacific oceans 
for both commerdal and military/strategic purposes was ever-
present in the tninds of those in the United States who concemed 
themselves with the área to the south. Diplomatic maneuvering 
in the área duríng the. second half of the 19th century was 
particulariy concemed with the control and protection of the 
Central American isthmus. The U.S. and the British were the 
principal players, although it should not be forgotten that the 
fírst attempts to dig a canal in Panamá were French. And, of 
course, there were then Spanish possessiOns of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico which had a place in strategic considerations. 
With the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt the U.S. 
arrived at the acmé of its hegemonic influence in the área. 
Secretary of State Olney stated, "The U.S. now acts as if it were 
sovereign" in the circum-Caribbean región. The U.S. was content 
to allow the "southem cone" nations - Brazil, Argentina and Chile 
- to continué to be dominated by British capitíd. Our interests in 
the drcimi-Caribbean were strategic and commerdal control, 
exerdsed through U.S. banks, multinational enterprises - the 
Uiüted Fruit Company, W.R. Crace and Standard Oil to mention 
three - Marine occupation when judged necessary, and, of course, 
the powerful U.S. Navy, 
This situation prevailed for most of the first part of this 
century up to World War II. Latin America was low on 
Washington's list of intemational concems as attention focused 
on Fasdst threats in Europe and Asia. By the end of the decade 
of the '3(fs the U.S. had relinquished the most overt elements of 
coerdon - the Marines were gone from Haiti, the Dominican 
Republic and Nicaragua, the Platt Amendment had been 
abrogated in Cuba, and at a series of Inter-American Conferences 
in the U.S. had formally renounced its rights to intervene in the 
intertial affairs of Panamá - but economic dominance, and ever 
present in the background, the possibility of military forcé 
continued to sustain U.S. power in the hemisphere. 
The"equity culture" was also present, if never dominant 
Centered at first in Boston, with intellectual opposition to U.S. 
actions in México in the 1840's, it continued to develop through 
the latter half of the 19th century with opposition to the 1898 
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war with Spain and later with protests against "Gunboat 
diplomacy" in the Caribbean. This concern with "equity" was also 
an element in U.S. attempts to set up a framework of treaties and 
agreements in the early years of this centuiy which it was hoped 
wotdd serve to control the endemic conflicts among Central 
American states. 
The various Inter-American conferences of the 1930's and 
1940's, undoubtedly motivated in part by security concems about 
possible Germán infiltration in the área, also had elements of 
concern with issues of political freedoms, democracy and htiman 
rights. 
But the divergent priorities which separated the U.S. from 
the rest of the hemisphere were also present U.S. policy was 
firmly based on economic and political concems. The fear of 
European fascism in the "iffs and, beginriing in 1945 and 
continuing to the present, fear of communism has been the 
principal basis for U.S. interest in Latín America. The possibility 
of Nazism spreading into the westem hemisphere accelerated the 
applicatíon of Franklin Rossevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. 
Through Nelson Rockefeller's Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs, U.S.-supported programs in public health, 
agricultural assistance, and road building started what later in the 
Truman period would become the "Point Four" program of 
technical assistance. 
After World War II, and particularly following the Korean 
War and the Berlin Blockade, the Cold War focused U.S. attention 
on the áreas contiguous to the Soviet Union which absorbed 
major blocks of U.S. financial assistance. The Marshall Plan was 
the basis for the economic recovery of the nations of Westem 
Europe, and similar massive transfers of capital and technical 
assistance provided the Ímpetus for the economic "mirades" of 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. 
But the economic assistance for the building of firmly-
based development stmctures which Latín America expected and 
awaited, particularly in view of their support for the Allied cause 
in World War II, did not materíalize. A westem hemisphere 
economic summit, which the Latín American natioiu had called 
for even before the war and which was a prime goal of their 
International agenda in the post-war years, was the object of U.S. 
-104 
procrastination and delibérate dilatory tactics. And when it did 
fínally come in 1954, the U.S. message \Mas what it had always 
been: "open your economies to intemational investment, and the 
prívate sector will take care of things." Needless to say, this was 
not what had been hoped for. 
There were voices both in the U.S. prívate sector and 
within the govemment which tríed to cali attention to the 
growing economic and political tensión in the área. However, it 
was not tintil the violent demonstrations against Vice President 
Richard Nixon in 1957 that high-level Washington attention 
became concemed with Latin Amerícan development. The 
amplifícation of aid projects, the creation of a social progress trust 
fund for soft loans to Latin Amerícan govemments for 
developmental purposes, the creation of an Ínter Amerícan 
Development Bank, all carne to fruition in the last years of the 
Eisenhower administration. These were then dramatized and cast 
in i\atíonal príoríty .terms through John Kenned/s rhetorícally 
inspiríng "Alliance for Progress". Although many of these 
initíatives included admirable attempts to 'address some of the real 
development issues of the hemisphere -redistríbution of a highly 
skewed income pattem, land reform, housing, public education 
and health reforms- their basic thrust was directed to insuríng 
the security of the United States against the threat of Commurtíst 
aggression. Testimony befóre varíous committees of the U.S. 
Congress makes this abundantly clear. The major thrust of U.S. 
foreign policy in Latin Ameríca in the aftermath of World War II 
and ríght up to the present has been based on perceptions of the 
Cold War - the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. locked in a mighty struggle 
for world hegemony - a deadly seríous zero-sum game in which 
ene side's gain is the other side's loss. 
That the realities of the situation confroriting the U.S. in 
the Western Hemisphere today have little to do with this issue 
only makes the forging of a policy for the área that much more 
difficult The real problems of the área - Debt, Drugs, 
Demography, Democracy, the Environment, and Development -
all a y out for attention, action and leadership. Yet public 
attention and public funds have been centered on possible 
oommunist threats in two very small courítríes in Central 
America. The self-proclaimed greatest accomplishment in Latín 
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America of the Reagan administration was the "reconquest" of a 
miniscule island of some 300 square kilometers misgovemed by a 
few dozen fuzzy-minded MarxistA-eninist theoreticians. 
Under the Bush administration it appears that this basic 
policy is in the process of change. Secretary of State Baker's 
carefully crafted plan for Central America would seem to indícate 
this to be the case. Although his arrangement for continued 
humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan Contras would seem to 
continué the support the Reagan anti-Communist policy, it is 
essentially an attempt to save face while accepting the defeat of 
Reagan's policy to remove the • Sandinista govemment in 
Managua. Byinvolving the Democratícally controUed Congress 
and grudgingly accepting the Arias peace plan for the área, the 
U.S. has marked the beginning of a new policy, a policy which 
accepts the rights of the Latin Americans themselves to particípate 
and perhaps even to direct policy in Central America. Let us 
hope so. 
But natíonal policies based on deeply-rooted and long-held 
perceptions are not easily ñor quickly altered. Ñor is the U.S. 
Congress likely tp vote for large-scale funding for programs not 
obviously tied to urgent matters of national defense against a 
clearly identified enemy. This is so particularly in these times of 
a growing awareness of the seriousness of the U.S. national 
déficit and Bush's promises of no new taxes. Thus the Bush 
administration in its Latín American and Caribbean policies must 
face crises on a series of issues which are not easily ñor clearly 
defined for the U.S. voting public, all of which are long-term in 
nature and none at which show prospects of easily measured 
"victories" in the style of Granada. 
Let US look briefly at some of these problems. The most 
salient in terms of U.S. public perceptíon is that of illegal drugs. 
Of the estimated $150 billion worid trade in narcotics, some $100 
billion is spent in the U.S. by its 27 to 30 million regular 
consumers. 
The burden of devising and implementing a policy on 
illegal drugs is a heavy one. And what work has to be done in 
this field is thus far without any show-pieces of success. A 
report to the Congress earlier this year by the Department of 
State reflects some of the thomy issues involved. 
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Despite billions of dollars expended and innumerable 
treaties and intemational accords directed at controlling this 
scourge, sobering statistics indícate that illegal drug production, 
distríbutíon, consumption and profits continué to rise sharply. 
The interrelationships of the drug business with 
intemational economic, political and social events are such that 
the report concludes that, "world events... have a devastating 
effect on efforts to reduce the global supply of drugs." This is 
particularly so in the Western Hemisphere. Economic crises in 
Perú, Panamá and several of the island republics in the 
Cañbbean^ political pressures exerted by the drug lords of 
Colombia and Bolivia; revolutionary situations in Central America, 
and the ever-sensitive multi-polar nature of our relationship with 
México, all combine with domestic U.S. concems and frustrations 
to render drug policy-making for the Western Hemisphere a 
veritable mine-field of difficulties. 
Congressionally-mandated requirements for Presidential 
certifícation that a nation is cooperating with the U.S. in anti-
drug activities in order to allow U.S. aid and MFN treatment only 
too often result in offense to friendly govemments trying to be 
helpful against overwhelming odds, as is the present case with 
México, or in U.S. backdowns against hostile or uncooperative 
govemments such as Panamá. And, of course, there is ever 
present in such situations the issue of U.S. meddling in the 
intemal affairs of other nations. This, given the history of our 
relations with the área, can only result in a most uncooperative 
and unpleasant relationship in general, often poisoning the 
atmosphere for productive cooperation. Mexican suggestions that 
major anti-drug activities be given to an intemational body, 
perhaps under UN aegis, have not elicited any U.S. reaction. 
However, after many years of the U.S. blaming only the 
suppliers and traffickers, and Latín Americans' pointing the finger 
orüy at U.S. demand as the culprit, a consensus seems to be 
evolving that the problem is more subtle and complex. Drug 
usage with all its evil effects is spreading world-wide rapidly both 
among affluent youth and throughout the ranks of the 
burgeorüng number of disillusioned and desperate urban 
unemployed. Any successful strategy must involve coordinated 
programs of attack on supply and demand. A combined assault 
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based on education and treatment, interdiction of supply, and 
tight control of money flows must be carried out in a sin¿e, on-
going, hard-hitting program. 
The impact of foreign policy on all of these elements, each 
of which is subject to so many other pressures, illustrates the 
partícularly frustrating nature of the drug problem. Treatment 
calis for massive outlays of cash, as does any sort of education 
program. Interdiction of supply requires extensive intemational 
cooperation and more often than not hs negative impacts on the 
economic, political and social fabric of the nations concemed. 
Where does the humble coca farmer in the Andes, or the 
marijuana cultivator in Jamaica, or the poppy grower in highland 
México, or, for that matter, the California marijuana farmer, find 
substitute crops to provide money for the bread on his table? 
How do the bankers and treasury officials in Colombia or Bolivia 
find the revenues to replace the drug doUars filling their foreign 
exchange needs? And how does a govemment confront the 
political, economic and military power of the drug lords who are 
not loath to use their enormous strength to overrule attempts to 
bring them to heel. The majority of the members of the Supreme 
Court of Colombia paid with their Uves for their valiant actions 
aimed at putting a stop to the growth of the political power of 
their native drug lords. 
With a growing awareness of the noxious effects of drugs 
on their own people, both the physical cost of growing addiction 
among the youth, and the moral degradation resulting from the 
system built around drugs, the producing and transshipping 
nations are beginning to show some willingness to join in 
cooperative efforts against the drug cartels. In 1985, the 
presidents of Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela issued a joint 
statement calling for the UN to declare the illegal drug trade a 
"crime against humanity." A resolution to this effect is slowly 
winding its way through the bureaucratic maze of the UN. 
Under the aegis of the OAS in 1982, an ínter American 
Convention on Illegal Drugs was drafted, opened for signature, 
and a small office set up to administer a modest program for the 
exchange of Information. Joint programs of search-and-destroy 
between the U.S. Coast Guard and Caribbean nations are in place 
and show some promise. Technical assistance in such fields as 
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crop substitutíon has also begun. But it must nevertheless be 
admitted that the trend remains negative: more drugs are being 
produced and shipped by more people to satisfy what is still a 
growing demartd in the natíon which is the largest consumer -
the United States. 
President Bush in his inaugural address made spedal 
mention of the scourge of illegal drugs, but his failure to 
adequately fund anti-narcotic programs in his budget ^bmission 
casts considerable doubt on the seriousness of his coimnitment 
Another área in which the Bush administration must begin 
to consider policy choices is that of demography. With a porous 
3,000 kilometer land frontier with México and an equally porous 
sea frontier on the Caribbean, the U.S. faces an influx of 
refugees, economic and political, pushed from their homelands by 
poverty and/or conflict and puUed to the U.S. by opporturúty for 
Jobs. A confused and vacilíating set of laws and guideUnes for 
an understaffed and underfunded Border Patrol and Immigration 
Service, coupled with the growing hispanization of many of the 
border áreas and an unfulfilled need for farm and unsldlled 
manufacturing labor, make for a veritable morass of immigration 
problems. By Congressional mándate, refugees from "Communist" 
countries are almost automatically afforded legal status. Thus 
Cubans and Nicaraguans are received fairly easily. On the other 
hand, Haitians, Salvadorans or Guatemalans fleeing the political 
violence in their countries are treated much differently. These 
contradictory regulations have even led to problems of civil 
disobedience in the U.S. The Sanctuary Movement dedicated to 
protecting illegal Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees has seen 
some of its leaders arrested and jailed for violating U.S. law when 
then they try to protect illegal immigrants. 
C)verwhelming all of these efforts is the problem of 
Mexican immigration. México is the source of the largest number 
of legal immigrants, - some 40,000 annually - but this number is 
dwarfed by the size of the illegal Mexican population in the U.S. 
which is estimated at between 2.5 and 4 million. There have 
been innumerable studies and recommendations conceming this 
issue. The Mexican govemment would prefer to see Mexican 
citizens employed in México in a revitalized economy, a goal 
shared by persons in the U.S. who are siezed of the issue. But 
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this possibility does not seem very viable, at least in the short 
term, for reasons related to the general economic situation in 
México. This is particularly so in light of its intemational debt 
burden and the bleak prospects for an upsurge in oil pnces, the 
only possible short-term source of alleviating Mexico's economic 
crisis. And so the flow of illegals continúes... 
Also salient under the nabric of demographic policy 
challenges is the issue of population control. The nations of 
Latín America include several which have population growth 
rates among the highest ¡n the world. U.S. support for 
poptdation control programs is dogged by a small but vociferous 
minority of "right-to-life" advocates who found support in the 
Reagan administration and who have been able to forcé inclusión 
of language in USAID legislation preventing the use of U.S. 
Government funds in any program providing Information about 
abortion. This has had a most negative impact on U.S. support 
for population control programs in Latin America as well as other 
áreas of the world. Since then Vice President Bush was the one 
to entmciate this policy at the 1984 UN Conference on Population 
in México City, it does not seem likely that a change in policy 
might be contemplated during his administration. 
Development should be another priority área for foreign 
policy initiatives by the Bush administration in Latín America. 
The nations of the Western Hemisphere are endowed with a 
plethora of natural resource - human, animal, vegetable and 
mineral. However, the capital and infrastructure for their 
exploitatíon are in very short supply. The vicious circle of lack 
of capital leading to lack of investment against a backdrop of 
general alck of confidence in the political and economic structures 
prevails throughout the región. Capital flight is endemic, with 
Swiss banks, U.S. real estáte and even the fluttering U.S. Stock 
Market holding much more attractíon for the Latin American 
inventor than entreprenurial undertakings in his own country or 
área. 
U.S. and intematíonally-financed development programs 
are very limited and often misguided. The largest U.S. financial 
aid operations for Latin America in this decade were concentrated 
in El Salvador in support of the failing Duarte govemmenfs 
futile war efforts against Marxist guerrillas. After eight years of 
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stronuous effort, the result is a standoff. ínter America Barik, 
Worid Baitk and Central America Bank efforts, while much more 
widely distríbuted, have also had many questionable resiilts. 
Loans have often been made to support the promotion oí exports 
to the developed world with little thought or attention paid to 
their impact on local subsistence food production or on their 
long-term environmental impact. Loans for the development of 
large-scale meat production to supply the first world's demands 
for hamburgers work to the detriment of the small subsistence 
farmer and often lead to severe long-term soil erosión. The 
indiscríminate cutting of forest preserves to satisfy growing world 
demand for timber often produces the same results. 
Protection of the environment is a major problem in the 
westem hemisphere. Water and air pollution, the disposal of 
waste, soil erosión and the greenhouse effect are all dramatic 
challenges to the development process, yet there is little more 
than rhetoric to confront them on a hemispheric basis. 
To expect the U.S. Congress to authorize any substantial 
funding for development programs in Latin America like those 
recommended but not funded for Central America in the 1984 
Kissinger Report is to expect the impossible. Appropriations for 
aid programs have not passed the U.S. Congress for the past five 
years because of lack of support. Program funding has been 
continued at the 1984 level by means of continuing resolution. 
In this time of economic stringency, there seems to be little 
possiblity for support in the U.S. Congress for new Latin 
American development initiatives this year. 
The Caribbean Basin Initiative was the Reagan 
administration's only innovative program for development 
assistance in Latin America. Based on the idea of encouraging 
investment and growth in the circum-Caribbean región through 
a combined program of U.S. tax incentives for American investors, 
fínancial aid, technical assistance and free access to the U.S. 
market for Caribbean products, the initial project appeared to 
contain much promise. However by the time the proposal made 
its way through the Congress, the investment incentives and 
duty-free product aspects had been gutted through strong 
lobbying tactics. Products in which Caribbean nations had a 
strong comparative advantage - garments, textiles, leather goods. 
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rum, processed tuna fish - were all eliminated to piotect U.S. 
producers. Sugar exports, the area's traditional source of foreign 
exchange revenues, were severely cut by a quota system. And 
what direct financial assistance as survived was given almost 
entirely to two Central American nations involved with U.S. 
political polides - El Salvador and Costa Rica. With cuts in the 
U.S. sugar quotas and a substantial drop in the demand for 
Caribbean oil and minerals, the net result of the Initiative has 
been negative. In the five years the program has been operative, 
doUar eamings in the Caribbean nations have dropped 
substantially and unemployment has increased dramatically. 
Nevertheless it must be admitted that the Bush 
administration has shown signs of innovation in two principal 
initiatives in Latin America. The Brady plan which for the first 
time gives official U.S. support to the concept of debt reduction 
or forgiveness by the banks will be discussed in detall by my 
coUeague Professor Cohén. The Bush/Baker initiative in Central 
America and support for the Esquipulas Plans is an admission 
that military forcé cannot resovlve the Nicaraguan imbroglio. 
However it should be observed that neither of these 
irútiatives is original with the new admirústratiort Each responds 
to the initiative of others. The Brady plan finally acknowíedges 
what Latin American statesmen and academics have maintained 
for several years. The Central American plan foUows the lead 
taken by the five Central American presidents under the 
stewardship of Osear Arias of Costa Rica. 
In the political history of Latin American nations U.S. 
intervention has a long, probably exaggerated but nevertheless 
partially factual basis. This is particularly true in the Caribbean 
basin with only a few, sporadic documented cases in the southem 
cone and Andean área. 
In Central America U.S. citizen intervention began in that 
most unappy tropical republics, Nicaragua, almost a century and 
a half ago. An American entrepreneur, Comelius Vanderbilt, 
taking advantage of the demand for rapid Atíantic-to-Padfic 
transport occasioned by the massive California gold strike of 1848 
set up a trans-isthmian ferry and stagecoach line across 
Nicaragua. The protection of this vital linkage occasioned 
military action by irregulars and mercenaries led by one who the 
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popidar press of the time described as the "grey-eyed man of 
destiny", William Walker. When the fortunes of war afforded 
him the opportunity, Walker dedared himself President of 
Nicaragua. VVhile his "presidency" did not endure long, his ñame 
became synonomous with Yankee intervention in Central America 
and is still invoked as a negative symbol by natioiuilists of all 
stripes in the área. 
As U.S. business interests grew in the Caribt>ean and 
particularly in the wake of the War of '98 and Theodore 
Roosevelt's "taking" of Panamá, U.S. involvement on the local 
political scene acquired a new dimensión. With the aid of the 
U.S. Marine Corps, governments were made and unmade in the 
Domincan Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Panamá, and 
U.S. influence made itself felt in El Salvador and Honduras. 
Even that paragon of democratic principies, Woodrow Wilson, 
was not immune from ^intervening in the infernal politics of the 
área when hé unsuccessfully attempted to install what he 
considered to be "democratic" leadership in México. 
During Franklin Roosevelfs period of the "Good 
Neighbor" there was much more restraint in that there was some 
positive U.S. reaction to Latin American voices at a series of Inter-
American conferences calling for non-intervention in their infernal 
affairs. This restraint was soon broken as Ambassador Spruille 
Braden's dumsy and unsuccessful attempt to unseat Juan Perón 
in Argentina brought hemispheric opprobrium on the U.S. once 
again. This was soon foUowed by President Eisenhower's actions 
in Guatemala which led to the overthrow of President Arbenz in 
1954. With the exception of Jimmy Cárter, who had he been 
reelected might himself have moved against Nicaragua, each 
succeeding U.S. president has condoned or sparked actions which 
have been perceived in Latin America as unwarranted 
intervention in the interna! affairs of a hemispheric nation -
Kennedy with the Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba, Johnson with the 
1965 landing of troops in the Dominican Republic, Nixon with his 
"second track" plotting against Chile's Allende regime, and 
Reagan's invasión of Grenada and support for the Nicaraguan 
Contras. 
Thus it is not without some basis that Latin America views 
with considerable suspidon any U.S. political initiatives in the 
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heptísphere. The current crisis which occupies the attention of 
the political establishments of the hemisphere is Central America. 
For the eight years of the Reagan administration the existence of 
an avowed Marxist-Leninist govemment in Nicaragua and of a 
powerful Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement in El Salvador have 
been the primary focus of U.S. policy concems in the Western 
Hentísphere. The bulk of U.S. financial aid and militaiy 
assistance has been used to support the Christian Democratic 
govemment of Napoleón Duarte in El Salvador, resulted in its 
survival but little more. Economically the Govemment of El 
Salvador is almost totally dependent on U.S assistance. Militarily 
the Armed Forces have made some slight progress but cannot be 
said to have any real prospect of defeating the guerrillas. And 
this has been achieved at a very high cost in human Ufe and 
without any improvement in the ghastly human rights record of 
the military. 
In Nicaragua, despite the best efforts of the CÍA, the anti-
Sandinista Contras have failed to spark any intemal support, hold 
any territory or win any significant battles. Today the bulk of 
their forces are regrouped in Honduras, vy^ here a reluctant U.S. 
Congress has provided "humanitarian" assistance to feed, clothe 
and house them while their political leadership in Miami 
squabbles over a series of political issues. 
After the discredited intellectual mentor of the Reagan 
administration's failed Central American policy, Eliot Abrams, 
resigned to join the ultra-right wing Heritage Foundation, - a 
bastión of conservative idealogues - the Bush administration has 
been very slow in selecting a new assistant secretary for ínter 
American affairs or in taking any policy initiatives with regard to 
this área. An assistant secretary has been named, Bemard 
Arenson, but he has kept a low profile. A Democrat with a 
record of support for the Contras and some pretense to 
knowledge of Nicaragua, he does not speak Spanish, ñor does he 
have any background or experience with any other aspect of 
Latin America. Rumor has it that he is already at odds with his 
counterpart on The National Security Council, a veteran Latin 
American expert with strong conservative credentials. 
In the meantime, as the U.S. appears to vacillate and react 
to the initiatives of others, the govemitients of the región have 
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assumed leadership. At a meeting on February 14th in El 
Salvador the five presidents of the Centfal American republics 
hammered out a series of agreements which could have a 
decisive impact Responding to an offer of President Ortega of 
Nicaragua to guarantee iritemal democratic reforms in his countiy 
- such as advancing the date of elections and freeing a large 
number of political prisoners - the presidents agreed to cooperate 
on a plan for disarming and removal of the Contra forces from 
their encampments in Honduras. They also agreed on several 
other measures aimed at strengthening isthmian cooperation, 
induding anti-drug actions, environmental protection an the 
prompt convening of the already agreed upon Central American 
parliament. The most recent Baker/Bush initiative may slow the 
Contra demobilization plan, but it cannot stop. 
Other developments affecting the área are also taking 
place. The Salvadoran guerrilla movement has proposed a plan 
to end the civil war which has devastated their country. The 
newly-elected conservative govemment has agreed to a series of 
meetings to consider the proposal and agreed to Román Catholic 
and International Organization participatioa There seems to be 
a basis for cautious optimism that the bloodshed which cost 
70,000 Salvadoran lives may at last be winding down. 
Another player in the Central American game is now the 
European Economic Community. In late February representatives 
of the foreign ministers of the EEC met in San Pedro Sula, 
Honduras, to map out plans for supporting integration and peace 
efforts. Four hundred and fifty million doUars of economic 
assistance in 1989 has already been allocated by the EEC, and the 
prospect exists for further amounts in development loans if peace 
can be acheived in the área. Further conversations between the 
EEC and Central Americans have continued. 
Apparently in response to these initiatives, the Bush 
administration has circulated a draft policy paper which outlined 
a projected diplomatic offensive in Central America. While its 
specifics were not clear, beyond continued humanitarian aid to 
the Contras, it did contain positive elements such as an offer to 
remove the economic boycott of Nicaragua and to increase 
diplomatic contacts on the condition that Nicaragua moved to 
ensure democratic freedoms. The implementation of these moves 
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apparently awaits the outcome of Nicaraguan electíons in early 
1990. 
In addition to the general hemisphere-wide issues 
mentioned, the Bush administration faces a long series of 
problems involving the U.S. and individual govemments of Latín 
America which cali for presidential or other high-level policy 
guidance. To cite a few examples we could begin with the 
Southern Cone. 
Argentina is still most resentful for what is seen there as 
the U.S. break with hemispheric solidarity in its support of Britain 
in the Malvinas/Falklands crisis. The specter of Malvinas still 
looms large in the background of any Argentine/U.S. relationship. 
And this is in addition to Argentina fiscal problems, possibly the 
worst in the hemisphere. Newly-elected president Menem has 
indicated his determination to address his nation's crisis in a 
fortright manner but it is much to eariy to see if he can succeed. 
In neighboring Chile relations with the United States are 
tense all across the poitical spectrum. General Pinochet and the 
military establishment are deeply resentful of what they see as 
unwarranted U.S. involvement in the Chilean political process 
through attacks on the regime's human rights record and the 
outspoken and anti-Pinochet stance of former U.S. ambassador 
Harry Bames. The ruling military profess profound 
disappointment at what they see as the failure of the United 
States to appreciate their 1973 ouster of the Marxist/Leninist 
govemment of President Salvador Allende. The modérate, 
centrist, anti-Pinochet political groups which succeeded last year 
in mustering sufficient voters to defeat General Pinochef s attempt 
to perpetúate himself in the presidency are still suspicious of U.S. 
motives because of the Allende overthrow caper and then for not 
taking stronger steps against Pinochet during the 16 years of his 
rule. On the left, the communists and left-wing socialists find it 
difficult to forget the apparent U.S. support for the overthrow of 
their elected president. Allende. On the extreme left, the Manuel 
Rodriguez guerrilla group has targeted the U.S. together with 
Pinochet as the hate-objects of their terrorist activities. Thus U.S. 
relations with the entire spectrum of Chilean political opinión 
needs careful and positive attention. 
In Paraguay the relationship of the United States with the 
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newly-installed govemment of General Rodríguez also presents 
problems. How can the U.S. Govemment support and encourage 
movement towards responsible and democratic govemment by 
this new administration which has so many ties to the venal and 
corrupt Stioessner dictatorship. 
With Brazil, the only other hemispheric nation with super-
power potential, U.S. policy-makers face a series of thomy 
problems to be played out against the backdrop of the developing 
worid's largest extemal debt. Trade issues indud Brazil's 
determination to protect its nascent computer industry, disputes 
over the functioning of the Intemational Coffee Agreement, U.S. 
countervailing duties against Brazilian leather goods, Brazil's 
reftisal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement, and 
resentment against U.S. efforts to intervene in opposition to West 
Germán sales of nuclear technology to Brazil. Further 
complications in relations result from Brazil's rejection of foreign 
advice or attempts at involvement in Amazonian development 
plans which appear to threaten the worid's largest rain forest and 
biota reserves. Nationalism runs strong and deep in Brazil. In 
this, Brazil can count on support from the other natioi\s of the 
Amazon basirv Recently, seven signatories to the 1978 Amazon 
Pact denounced foreign pressures to save the Amazon rain forest, 
dedaring that they woidd not take orders from abroad in their 
ecological polides. 
Intimately related to the drug issue but having possible 
repercus^ons in the whole arena of political relationships in the 
question of Panamá. The U.S. targeted Panamanian strongman 
General Manuel Antonio Noriega over a year ago. His 
indictment on dmg charges by a Florida court was the trigger of 
what was expected to be an easily-managed ouster. However 
things did not go as Washington planned. Economic sanctions 
and a dumsy attempt to engineer a coup by some of his militaiy 
colleagues had no effect. The only result of this Reagan policy 
was the growing impoveríshment of the Panamanian middle class 
and the development of an increasingly hostile populist 
govemment totally controlled by Noriega and his drug-runrtíng 
henchmeiv After the nullification of the presidential election of 
last May and the installation of a Noriega-controlled puppet 
regime, the U.S. no longer recognizes any govemment of 
-117 
Panamá. But with the country in a state of economic chaos and 
various U.S. actions required by early 1990 by the tenns of the 
1976 Panamá Canal Treaty, it would seem that pressure for 
indication of U.S. planned policy will soon have to be 
forthcoming. Recommendations by some elements of the 
Panamanian opposition to Noriega, the U.S. military commander 
in the región and U.S. members of the Canal Company Board 
that negotiations be undertaken with Noriega were rejected by 
the Reagan administration in late 1988 and may well be ready for 
reconsideration. But with the passing of time it would appear 
that the U.S. bargaining posture is weakening rather than 
strengthening. In the meantime, long-time opponents of the 
Canal Treaty in the U.S. Congress who failed to block it in the 
Cárter admirüstration are reported to be preparing actions 
designed to try to abrógate the Treaty if Noriega remains in 
power. This move might play well in certain sectors of the U.S. 
public, especially in view of the Noriega drug connection and the 
general public frustration with the issue. In Latin America, 
however, it would have a very negative impact and severely 
complícate U.S. relationships with the rest of the hemisphere. 
The bilateral relationship which overshadows all other is, 
of course, that between the United States and its nearest southem 
neighbor - México. Beginning with the fact that over half of 
what was Mexican territory at the time of its liberation from 
Spanish domination is now part of the United States, the 
relationship is a delicate one. Mexican sensitivity is extremely 
high to any U.S. move which could be interpreted. as affecting 
México. Immigration, environment, water resources, narcotics, 
foreign investment, security, tourism, telecommunications, cultural 
exchange - all of these issues enter in MexicanAJ.S. relations and 
their management requires caref-ul and constant attention. That 
the Bush administration is aware of the importance of the 
Mexican/U.S. interface is evidenced by the fact that in Décember, 
as presidents-elect, Bush and Salinas de Gortari met for informal 
discussions. Also, the first Bush ambassadorial appointment in 
Latin America was to México. Incidentally, the nominee, John 
Negroponte, was not well received by the Mexican media and the 
Mexican Congress voiced its opposition as well. Negroponte was 
U.S. ambassador in Honduras in the early 1980's and was 
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reputedly heavy-handed in his relations with the govemment of 
Honduras. Nevertheless he is a highly-regarded career foreign 
service officer who obviously enjoys the personal confidence of 
President Bush. 
Finally there is the question of superpower confrontation 
and Latín America. Since so much of the United States' interest 
in Latín America in the last half-century has been related to 
perceived Soviet threats of Soviet encroachments in the área, we 
cannot speak of Bush administration policies toward the 
Caribbean and Latín America without some examination of just 
how the superpower confrontation influences U.S. policy there. 
The major element in this confrontation is, of course, 
Cuba. We do not have the time or the expertise to analyze the 
background to Cuba's integration into the Soviet sphere of 
influence. It suffices to say that Cuba is a Soviet ally which in 
many ways serves the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals in the 
Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. It is a valuable intelligence 
base, a potential military base, and a conduit for Soviet money 
and arms to anti-U.S. insurgency movements in the hemisphere. 
Cuba cannot be ignored in any discussion of U.S. poicy 
formulation for Latín America. This is partícularly so with regard 
to the Sandinista govemment in Nicaragua which looks to Cuban 
premier Fidel Castro as its mentor and to the guerrilla movements 
ín El Salvador and Nicaragua which receive moral and probably 
military support from Cuban sources. As a revolutionary who 
has Idcked "Únele Sam" in the face and gotten away with it. 
Castro and his martyred side-kick. Che Guevara, are also hero 
shrínes to the innumerable student groups throughout the área 
who look upon the U.S. as the source of all the evíl that has 
befallen Latín America and the Caribbean. 
Cuba's economic model attracts few foUowers these days, 
but as a charismatic visionary Castro's political impact cannot be 
díscounted. In his campaign rhetoric in 1980 and through the 
speeches of his bellicose first Secretary of State, Ronald Reagan 
talked ominously of "going to the source" and made implied 
threats of invasión against the Cuban govemment. Such threats 
dísappeared with the resignation of Alexander Haig, and the 
Bush administration has no such ideological baggage to influence 
its policy toward Cuba. 
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On the other hand, Bush is not without domestic 
constraints regarding his policy toward Cuba. The right wing of 
his Republican Party, and particularly the powerful Cuban «dle 
community based in Miami, has never relaxed its strident attacks 
on Castro. It has used its political power and wealth to maintain 
pressure on the U.S. Congress to keep Castro isolated and the 
1961 economic blockade in place. It succeeded in foFdng the 
establishment of Radio Marti, an anti-Castro radio station located 
in the Florida Keys, and is presently lobbying strongly and fairly 
successfully for the opening of TV Marti to telecast into Havana. 
They have also succeeded in having Armando Valladares, a 20-
year political prisoner of Castro's, named U.S. ambassador to the 
UN Human Rights Committee, where the U.S. in 1988 used up all 
its political capital in vainly seeking support for a resolution 
condemning human rights violations in Cuba. 
Any change in the present status of U.SyCuba relations 
would not seem probable at this time. Nevertheless there is one 
gleam of light in this situation. Last year, low-level offícial 
conversations did take place in New York between Cuba and the 
U.S. on the issue of drug srríuggling. The danger of drug 
addiction, particularly among the large number of troops 
retuming from África, may pu.sh Cuba into considering some sort 
of exchange of Information or even cooperation on drug 
smuggling in the Caribbean. 
Other elements of concern related to the superpower 
confrontation indude the possibility of Soviet air or submarine 
bases in Nicaragua. Sandinista peace offers to include guarantees 
against the use of their territories by extra-hemispheric powers in 
bilateral conversations with the U.S. have so far been ignored. 
A Soviet military training mission in Perú and arms sales to Perú 
and Argentina are also possible issues. 
In the economic and commercial sphere the Soviets have 
become the major purchaser of Argentine wheat and, in the past 
two years, a buyer of Honduran and Dominican sugar and Costa 
Rican coffee. A Soviet fishing agreement with Perú has 
generated considerable controversy in Lima. 
All of this together is of very minor economic importance, 
but it does have a psychological impact and provides both sides -
the Latins and the Soviets - with increasing-expertise in such 
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dealings. 
With the Iron Curtain becoming increasingly porous with 
every passing*month - Europe's east-west frontier is crossed 
regularly in both directions - the possibility of blocking 
Soviet/Latín American intercourse on all levéis is ridiculous. U.S. 
policy in the westem Hemisphere must reflect the realities of a 
world far different form that which inspired NATO, the Marshall 
Plan, and the Rio Treaty. In 1992 a united Europe will become 
a world economic superpower. Japan is already there, and 
ASEAN is well on the way. U.S. policies in the Westem 
Hentísphere must respond to these new realities. 
To sum up then: the Bush ad mi rustra tion faces south to 
a great number of difficult and challenging issues, none of which 
is of easy or rapid solution. Superpower confrontation in a 
military sense is not in the front rank. Rather, the challenges of 
the next decade are in the fields mentioned at the beginning of 
this presentation. Debt^  development, demography, drugs, as well 
as defense, must be addressed as the priority issues. In the 
course of the next few months we should begin to see how this 
new administration plans to attack them. Early moves in the 
field of Central American peace initiatives and Latín American 
debt and positíve reactíons to these initíatíves would seem to 
indícate that the tíde is tuming. Let us hope that this new 
administration can maintain its Ímpetus, keeping in mind the 
words of Shakespeare in Tulius Caesar: 
"There is a tide in the affairs of men. 
Which, talcen at the flood, leads on to fortune; 
Omitted, all the voyages of their Ufe 
Is bound in shallows and misen es." 
